of Religious Experience has been so influential that the (Jamesian) puzzle of experience and expression casts a shadow over both disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches.2 Taking extreme examples as the point of departure,3 James's Gifford Lectures allocated the experience of religion to the extraordinary rather than the ordinary. But the contributions to our compilation call James's confinement of 'experience' into question. Here, those contributions which put expression back into experience are crucial.
When Jörg Lauster explores the experience in the example of a dancing plastic bag in Sam Mendes's film American Beauty (1999), he expands the horizon for experience. What he assesses as experience of transcendence can be found in everyday life.4 Johannes Kleine describes the close analogy between the mystical and the aesthetical, suggesting that transcendence might be experienced through literature. Similarly, Amber L. Griffioen's account stresses the similarities between religious and non-religious experience by identifying the ways we relate to fictional characters. Graham Ward points to perception as a mode of experience which could be qualified as a root of religion because acts of perception involve transcendence. Accordingly, the distinction between religious and non-religious experience is relativized. Ward quasi-quarantines the terminology of religious and non-religious experience.5 Echoing Mircea Eliade, Werner G. Jeanrond affirms that any subject or any object might manifest a transcendence which needs to be approached indirectly rather than directly through the detour of its manifestations. Marijn de Jong employs Karl Rahner's notion of the experience of "self-presence (Bei-Sich-Selber-Sein)", including the ramifications such a notion has for our accounts of experience and expression. Correspondingly, Knut Wenzel advocates the Rahnerian category of transcendental experience, anchored as it is in the structure of subjectivity, which he conceives of as "supra-religious" because it can be filled religiously and nonreligiously. Ulrich Schmiedel argues that relations to what he calls "the finite other" and relations to what he calls "the infinite other" are structured similarly. Hence, relations to any other involve moments of transcendence which is
